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OPENING CLOSED SKIES: THE PROSPECTS FOR





THIS ARTICLE examines possible courses for the fu-
ture development of regulation of international air
transport services. The implications flowing from this
subject matter are significant. Air transport has proven to
be among the most important infrastructure industries of
the twentieth century. Commerce, communications and
national defense all have been heavily dependent on an
efficient and reliable air transportation system,' which has
led air transport to be treated throughout its history as a
unique industry. Even among more market-oriented
countries, it has been characterized by regulation, protec-
tion and direct state involvement far exceeding that in
other service industries.
Airlines have been the object of this state intervention.
From their beginning, they have been considered by their
"home" states more as essential public utilities than as
businesses to be left subject to the vagaries of the market-
place. They were assigned a strategic role as instruments
* LL.B., Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1979; LL.M., George
Washington University National Law Center, 1991. Counsel, Department of Jus-
tice, Ottawa, Canada. The views expressed in this article are those of the author
alone.
I OLIVERJ. LISSITZYN, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT AND NATIONAL POLICY 18-
19, 38 (1942).
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of public, if not foreign, policy, often outweighing any
consumer-oriented concerns of cost competitiveness. It is
not surprising, then, that states have found it necessary to
protect this privileged role through an elaborate network
of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral regulatory meas-
ures that restrict airline market entry and free
competition.
There has been a revolution of sorts over the past fif-
teen years, however. As the air transport industry ex-
panded and matured, its unique status came to be
questioned: What reason remained to subject airlines to
pricing and capacity controls? Why should airlines not be
free to compete in the domestic and foreign marketplaces
according to market principles? Did air transport con-
tinue to merit distinction from other service industries?
The immediate response to these questions was eco-
nomic deregulation,2 a process initiated by the United
States government in the late 1970s according to its long-
held "open skies" philosophy and since exported in vary-
ing degrees to other countries where it has more com-
monly been referred to as "liberalization." As airline
operating environments become increasingly deregulated
or liberalized in more countries, the logical conclusion of
the process would appear to be free trade in international
air transport services. But it is not so straightforward.
While there is certainly no denying that domestic deregu-
lation is now firmly entrenched in many countries
(although it is generally regarded to have enjoyed only
limited success), it has proceeded with less alacrity at the
international level. Universal free trade in international
air transport services remains a distant goal.
Deregulation essentially denies that air transport is a
unique industry deserving of government intervention in
Safety deregulation, of course, was never contemplated. But see infra notes 94-
95, 176-80 and accompanying text.
-1 "Free trade" has been defined as "[the flow of trade based on supply and
demand, free from governmental regulations, controls, and promotional activi-
ties." JACK C. PLANO, THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DICTIONARY 127 (1982).
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various manners. The purpose of this article is to test the
validity of that assertion and thereby to assess the pros-
pects for the development of the limited deregulation that
exists today into full-blown multilateral free trade in air
transport services. Underlying the analysis are two
themes: to what extent can international air transport be
liberalized; and what is the best means of reaching that
goal.
Discussion will first focus on the evolution of regulation
and the experience to date of deregulation in respect to
both domestic and international air transport. An analysis
of the factors that presently obstruct further liberalization
follows. Various measures - unilateral, bilateral, multi-
lateral - to further development toward liberalization of
trade in international air services will then be suggested.
The conclusion reached is that while air transport may not
be as unique an industry as states have traditionally main-
tained, there remains more at stake in that industry than
concerns for unrestricted competition in a free market.
As a result, the process at the international level will likely
be limited in the short term to achieving varying degrees
of liberalization restricted to a broad bilateral, or possibly
regional multilateral, basis.
II. EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC REGULATION
To understand the pressures for and against liberaliza-
tion of trade in international air transport services, it is
important initially to appreciate the nature of market reg-
ulation under international and national law, and why reg-
ulation was thought essential in the first place. Air law,
virtually from its inception, has been the product of for-
mal international agreement (unlike maritime law which
derives primarily from customary international law). 4
Consideration of the various multilateral and bilateral
conventions must therefore be undertaken before turning
But see Joseph Z. Gertler, Custom in International Air Relations, 10 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 63 (1985) (discussing the development of international air relations from
custom).
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to a discussion of the extent to which states have regu-
lated air transport unilaterally. Only then can the pros-
pects for liberalization of air transport services be fairly
assessed.
1. Multilateral Regulation: The Chicago Convention
The concept of state sovereignty has proven to be the
primary basis for restrictions on trade throughout the his-
tory of international air transport. Conflict between the
principles of "freedom of the air" and states' control over
their airspace arose as early as the Paris Conference of
1910, at which time the tendency was already to favor
state sovereignty. 5 The Paris Convention of 1919,6 how-
ever, was the first significant multilateral development in
international air transport. Its first article states: "every
[state] has complete and absolute sovereignty over the
airspace above its territory."' 7 The foundation for the reg-
ulation of air transport was thereby firmly established.
States had asserted the right to control all activity, includ-
ing commercial flight, in their airspace.
As commercial air traffic expanded, states found it nec-
essary to meet again in Chicago in 1944 to address the
growing number of political, economic, and technical
problems. 8 The result was the Chicago Convention 9
The Conference was initiated by the French government which had been
seeking an agreement to regulate repeated incursions of German balloons over its
territory. See John C. Cooper, The International Air Navigation Conference, Paris 1910,
19J. AIR L. & CoM. 127-43 (1952) (analysis of air navigation conferences on con-
trol of air space).
11 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11
L.N.T.S. 173. The Convention was prompted by post-war growth in aviation in-
cluding the first scheduled air service between Paris and London early in 1919.
7 Id. at 190. A free airspace analogous to the principle of maritime law was
probably rejected in part due to strong nationalistic tendencies following the First
World War. See I. H. PHILEPINA DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR
LAW 2 (1988).
. Several attempts to achieve multilateral agreement on international air trans-
port services had been made during the intervening period. See, e.g., Ibero-Ameri-
can Convention Relating to Aerial Navigation, Nov. 1, 1926, JAL 263; Pan-
American International Convention on Commercial Aviation, Feb. 20, 1928, 47
Stat. 1901. None of these attracted widespread support, however. See PAUL S.
DEMPSEY, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AvIATION 48-49 (1987).
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which has as one of its fundamental principles the premise
that all states should be able to participate in air transport
on the basis of equality of opportunity.' 0 Its first article
also confirms state sovereignty, however, which effectively
amounts to a contradiction of the right of states to partici-
pate equally in the provision of air transport services.
One author has stated that "[t]he implementation of this
principle (of state equality) ... is hampered by the limita-
tions of rights states can impose upon each other, limita-
tions which find their origin in the principle of
sovereighty of the state over the airspace above its terri-
tory expressed in Article 1 of the Convention."" As a re-
sult, the extent to which airlines would be able freely to
participate in international air transport was to depend on
the extent to which states were mutually willing to surren-
der their sovereignty in that regard. The Chicago Confer-
ence provided a multilateral opportunity for states to
respond accordingly through a broad exchange of airline
operating rights, but it was not to be.
On the one hand, the United States pressed at Chicago
for relatively unrestricted operating rights for airlines on
international routes, its philosophy being that a laissez-
faire, free-trade approach would allow for air transport
services, much like commodities, to be provided in the
most efficient and economical manner. In pursuit of this
policy, American negotiators called for a multilateral
granting of the five "freedoms of the air"' 12 and insisted
that the determination of capacities, frequencies, and
1) Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180,
T.I.A.S. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
- The preamble concludes: "THEREFORE, the undersigned governments having
agreed on certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil
aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international air
transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and
operated soundly and economically... [h]ave accordingly concluded this conven-
tion to that end". Id.
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 7, at 11.
, The Canadian delegation at the Chicago Conference formulated the concept
of "freedoms of the air," the first five of which were discussed at that forum:
6 3
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fares be left to market forces.' 3
On the other hand, the United Kingdom, concerned
that its post-war aviation industry needed a period of re-
covery, suggested the creation of an "International Air
Authority" to coordinate air transport, apportion the
world's air routes, and make decisions on frequencies and
tariffs in accordance with agreed criteria designed to
"avoid wasteful competition."' 4  There were other,
equally restrictive proposals. Canada recommended a
more elaborate version of the United Kingdom proposal,
and Australia and New Zealand called for the internation-
alization of major international airlines under the direc-
tion of a single authority in which all states would
participate.' 5
All of these proposals foundered. Participants at the
conference generally opposed the multilateral granting of
the five freedoms with no capacity or frequency restric-
tions out of fear that such a system would confer on the
United States a near-monopoly on many international
routes. At the same time, they opposed the creation of an
international authority to regulate international air trans-
port as being impractical.
1. The right to fly over the territory of another country without landing.
2. The right to land in another country for technical reasons.
3. The right to discharge traffic from the home country in a foreign country.
4. The right to pick up traffic in a foreign country bound for the home coun-
try.
5. The right to pick up traffic in a foreign country and convey them to yet
another country, provided that the flight originates or terminates in the home
country. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2-6
(1981).
In fact, the nature of the freedoms of the air is such that they should really be
considered restrictions on international air transport: "[E]very newborn freedom
of the air is in reality another shackle to be removed at a price." BIN CHENG, THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 17 (1962).
'1 LOWENFELD, supra note 12, at 2-7, 2-8.
14 Id. at 2-8 (quoting BRITISH WHITE PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT
[]CMD. 6561).
I See generally WENCESLAS J. WAGNER, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION AS
AFFECTED BY STATE SOVEREIGNTY 95-112 (1970) (proposals advanced by United
States, Great Britain, New Zealand, Canada, and several other nations); DIEDER-
IKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 7, at 9 (overview of the major trends and of
Scandanavian & Netherlands views).
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Article 5 of the Chicago Convention afforded a compro-
mise of sorts, granting the freedom to operate interna-
tional services but limiting it to non-scheduled flights only,
subject to any regulations, conditions or limitations im-
posed by the state of destination.' 6 Article 6, on the other
hand, categorically states that "[n]o scheduled international
air service' 7 may be operated over or into the territory of
a contracting State, except with the special permission or
other authorization of that State.""' As a result, the only
recourse for airlines operating scheduled international air
services - which constituted the vast majority of interna-
tional air services - was to seek unilateral concessions by
states or bilateral exchanges of rights between states. By
default, then, airlines relied on bilateralism to regulate
the parameters of international air transport. Indeed, Ar-
ticle 6, although it does not necessarily imply the formal
exchange of traffic rights through bilateral agreements,
- Chicago Convention, supra note 9, art. 5.
17 A scheduled international air service is a series of flights that
possesses all of the following characteristics:
a) it passes through the air-space over the territory of more than
one State;
b) it is performed by aircraft for the transport of passengers, mail
or cargo for remuneration, in such a manner that each flight is open
to use by members of the public;
c) it is operated, so as to serve traffic between the same two or
more points, either
i) according to a published time-table, or
ii) with flights so regular or frequent that they constitute a rec-
ognizable systematic series.
Definition of a Scheduled International Air Service, ICAO Doc. 7278-C/841 (1952), re-
vised by ICAO Doc. 7278/2 (1985).
18 Chicago Convention, supra note 9, art. 6. The International Air Services
Transit Agreement, another agreement made at Chicago Convention, mitigated
this provision somewhat. It provides for the multilateral exchange of the first two
"technical" freedoms of the air, a useful minimum for scheduled international
operations. See supra note 12. One hundred states are currently party to this in-
strument. International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat.
1693, E.A.S. No. 487. The Chicago Conference also produced the International
Air Transport Agreement, which would have multilaterally granted the remaining
three freedoms. It never received sufficient ratifications to come into force, how-
ever. International Air Transport Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 59
Stat. 1701, E.A.S. No. 488.
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can be described as the charter of bilateralism. 9
The Chicago Conference may have failed to formulate a
comprehensive economic policy for international civil avi-
ation or to give effect to a multilateral exchange of traffic
rights, but the establishment of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the provisions for
technical regulation have nevertheless made the Chicago
Convention one of the most successful international
agreements ever negotiated.2 0 Even within the economic
sphere, pursuant to the objectives enumerated in Article
44,21 ICAO has achieved modest success in simplifying
procedures for the air transport industry and in setting
the framework for future bilateral agreements.
Several other efforts to regulate international air trans-
port on a multilateral basis followed the Chicago Conven-
tion. These efforts were directed primarily at achieving
greater coordination and freedom of air transport opera-
tions among states, but none have been successful. 22
[I, Henri A. Wassenbergh, Paralles and Diferences in the Development of Air, Sea and
Space Law in the Light of Grotius' Heritage, 9 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 163, 171 n.16
(1984). "Article 6 of the Chicago Convention has become the starting point for
the present restrictive bilateralism in the exchange of operational and traffic rights
for international scheduled air services." Id.
20, Michael Milde, The Chicago Convention - After Forty Years, 9 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 119, 122 (1984). The Chicago Convention established ICAO as "an in-
ternational organization with wide quasi-legislative and executive powers in the
technical regulatory field and with only consultative and advisory functions in the
economic sphere." Id.
2' Art. 44 states that
[t]he aims and objectives of the Organization are to develop the
principles and techniques of air navigation and to foster the plan-
ning and development of international air transport so as to:
(d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular,
efficient and economical air transport;
(e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition;
(f) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully respected
and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate
international airlines.
Chicago Convention, supra note 9, art. 44.
22 In 1945, the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO)
Secretariat prepared a Draft Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in In-
ternational Air Transport, which the first ICAO Assembly ultimately rejected in
1947 for reasons similar to those at Chicago. Multilateral Agreement on Commercial
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What has been achieved, nevertheless, is a notable mea-
sure of cooperation through multilateral agreements
among governments on a regional level. 23
2. Bilateral Regulation: Bermuda I
Following the 1919 Paris Convention, most interna-
tional air transport was conducted pursuant to some form
of bilateral agreement on the basis of reciprocity,24
although in exceptional cases rights were granted unilat-
erally.25 With the failure of the Chicago Conference to
realize the five freedoms of the air through multilateral-
ism, this pattern continued. States had no alternative but
to continue to grant each other commercial traffic rights
on a reciprocal basis through bilateral agreements, now
based on Article 6 of the Chicago Convention.
This is not to say, of course, that the five freedoms, or
Rights in International Air Transport, PICAO Doc. 2866, AT/169, Feb. 26, 1947. At
least four regional agreements have been concluded on a multilateral basis, but
only with respect to non-scheduled international flights (the Agreement on Com-
mercial Rights of Non-Scheduled Air Services in Europe, Apr. 30, 1956, and the
Agreement on Commercial Rights of Non-Scheduled Air Service in South-East
Asia, Mar. 13, 1971) or ratemaking (the 1967 International Agreement on the
Procedure for the Establishment of Tariffs for Scheduled Air Services, July 10,
1967, and The Memorandum of Understanding between ECAC States and the
United States, May 2, 1982). See generally PETER HAANAPPEL, PRICING AND CAPAC-
rrY DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 18-24 (1984); WAGNER,
supra note 15, at 147-62 (discussion of freedoms resulting from the Chicago Con-
ference); John C. Cooper, The Proposed Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in
International Civil Air Transport, 14 J. AIR L. & COM. 125 (1947) (discussion of the
proposed freedoms); Robert J.G. McClurkin, The Geneva Commission on a Multilat-
eral Air Transport Agreement, 15 J. AIR L. & COM. 39 (1948) (consideration of alter-
native proposals).
" E.g., the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC); the African Civil Avia-
tion Commission (AFCAC); the Civil Aviation Council of Arab States (CACAS);
the Latin American Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC). See generally JACQUES
NAVEAU, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT IN A CHANGING WORLD 67-80 (1989);
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 7, at 36-41.
21 Canada and the United States, for example, signed a broad agreement in
1929 providing for a number of matters including air transport services; the even
more restrictive Agreement Relating to Air Navigation followed in 1938. See
HAANAPPEL, supra note 22, at 26.
2 Pan American Airways, for example, was granted exclusive operating privi-
leges by numerous Latin American governments which sought increased commer-
cial aviation services. See ANTHONY SAMPSON, EMPIRES OF THE SKY: THE POLITICS
AND CARTELS OF WORLD AIRLINES 44-46 (1984).
607
608 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [57
even absolute free trade in air transport services, could
not be broadly negotiated on a bilateral basis. In fact, in
the months immediately following the conclusion of the
Chicago Convention, the United States entered into very
liberal bilateral agreements with a substantial number of
countries based on the Form of Standard Agreement for Provi-
sional Air Routes developed at the Chicago Conference as a
model bilateral agreement. 26 Despite the proliferation of
these early liberal agreements, however, the Chicago
Standard Agreement was not to serve as the primary
model for future bilateral air transport agreements. That
role was reserved for the bilateral agreement concluded in
1946 between the world's two leading civil aviation pow-
ers at the time, the United States and the United
Kingdom.
The so-called Bermuda I Agreement 27 was important
because it represented a compromise between the two
countries whose philosophies had been most divergent at
the Chicago Conference. 28 It is characterized by a restric-
tive pricing regime, yet relatively liberal route descrip-
tions and capacity arrangements.29  Specifically, the
United States retreated from its earlier opposition to any
form of international regulation of fares by agreeing to
delegate primary fare-setting responsibility to the Interna-
tional Air Transport Association (IATA), subject to the
211 Bilateral agreements based on the Chicago Standard Agreement were en-
tered into with Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den and Switzerland. All but that with Canada exchanged all five freedoms, with
no restrictions on pricing or capacity. See HAANAPPEL, supra note 22, at 17-18.
27 Air Services Agreement between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland, Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499 (1946) [hereinafter Bermuda I].
28 Such an agreement was necessary between the two leading
civil aviation powers of the world because of the difference in their
approaches to the problem of the exchange of commercial air rights
which had become evident in Chicago. The agreement constituted a
compromise between the liberal American and the restrictive British
concepts.
Albert W. Stoffel, American Bilateral Air Transport Agreements on the Threshold of the Jet
Transport Age, 26J. AIR L. & COM. 119, 122 (1959).
29 See generally, DEMPSEY supra note 8, at 53-69; NAVEAU, supra note 23, at 36-45.
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approval of both governments. In exchange, the United
Kingdom retreated from its earlier insistence on regula-
tion of capacity by agreeing to allow airlines the freedom
to determine their frequency on a given route, subject to
review by the governments ex post according to the prin-
ciple that capacity offered "should bear a close relation-
ship to the requirements of the public for such
transport.13 0 It further agreed to an extensive list of spec-
ified routes between the two countries, a more general
concession of fifth freedom rights, and a flexible designa-
tion by a state of one or more airlines having substantial
ownership and effective control in the hands of that state's
nationals .
Bermuda I became the prototype for bilateral air trans-
port agreements for thirty years following its conclusion.
In retrospect, it actually went a considerable distance to-
wards liberalizing and stabilizing trade in air transport
services, particularly with regard to capacity. Moreover,
its delegation of fare-setting to IATA has arguably had the
effect of "achieving multilateralism through bilateral-
* "32ism, especially considering that this provision was
probably the most adopted in subsequent bilaterals. 3 On
the other hand, Bermuda I reinforced the role of national
governments in formulating international civil aviation
policy,3 4 which probably aggravated the principle of sov-
ereignty underlying international air transport. Similarly,
the airline ownership and control requirements in its
designation provisions reinforced the concept of national-
ity of airlines. Its legacy, then, was that states began to
interpret traffic rights as rights of ownership not to be
o Bermuda I, supra note 27, para. 3, at 1515.
I" /d.
.2 NAVEAU, supra note 23, at 40. In fact, Bermuda I had raised hopes at the time
of its conclusion that, notwithstanding the failure at Chicago, a multilateral agree-
ment for the exchange of traffic rights might be within reach after all. See Baker,
The Bermuda Plan as the Basis for a Multilateral Agreement, in IVAN A. VLASIC & MARTIN
A. BRADLEY, I THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW OF AIR TRANSPORT (1948).
"- HANNAPPEL, supra note 22, at 37.
.4 See generally NICOLAS M. MATrE, TREATISE ON AIR-AERONAUTICAL LAW 229-50
(1981).
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dealt away until the right price was paid.3 5 Although traf-
fic rights are in fact the commercial stock of airlines, they
were not considered to "belong" to airlines and were fre-
quently withdrawn by states for reasons unknown to
them. Such were the shortcomings that ultimately were to
result in the collapse of Bermuda I.
3. Unilateral Regulation: National Legislation
While bilateral agreements form the framework for the
economic regulation of international air transport, it is
important for a number of reasons also to consider na-
tional regulation. First, national legislation is required to
give effect to bilateral agreements within a state's jurisdic-
tion, at least in those states where treaties are not self-
executing. Second, bilateral agreements do not deal with
non-scheduled services; these services are therefore left
subject to authorization by a state, usually as provided for
in that state's legislation.
Most important, however, is the fact that occasionally
national regulation (or deregulation, as will be seen) is ef-
fectively "exported" into the international arena through
various means. So while in the first instance international
air transport may be regulated bilaterally through interna-
tional agreement, the nature of that regulation is driven
to a large extent by national regulation of domestic air
transport promulgated by the more influential states.
Therefore, domestic regulation is often a precursor to
similar regulation of international services, and in fact de-
rives to a great extent from the same philosophy.
Generally speaking, that philosophy in the early years of
air transport was to protect what was considered to be a
frail but increasingly vital "public utility" industry. 6 This
• .1 Bermuda I "conveyed to some the impression that States were to share properties
rather than allocate markets." NAVEAU, supra note 23, at 45 (emphasis in original).
An extreme application of the sovereignty principle has led some states even to
commercialize the first two "freedoms" of the air. For example, the Soviet Union,
Indonesia, and the Phillipines have all sought compensation for overflight rights.
See Wassenbergh, supra note 19, at 171 n.17.
- In the United States, for example, the sponsor of a bill that was ultimately to
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protection manifested itself in the form of strict controls
on market entry, pricing, and capacity to insulate nascent
airlines from the deleterious effects of wide-open compe-
tition, a particular concern after the Great Depression.
Ironically, this was perhaps more true for the United
States, where private airline ownership was prevalent,
than for other countries whose airlines for the most part
were owned by national governments.3 7 The Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 193838 was therefore passed with a view to
establishing a system for the orderly development of air
transportation. It created the Civil Aeronautics Authority,
the predecessor of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), o
and, according to the criterion of "public convenience
and necessity," assigned to that agency the role of re-
stricting the awarding of new routes to airlines and con-
trolling market entry through an airline licensing
process. 40 In an effort to strengthen the emerging indus-
try, the CAB consistently resisted new airlines' efforts to
enter.4' Its success in this regard was eventually to obvi-
ate its existence.
In other countries, protective "public utility" regulation
of international air transport has typically been exercised
become the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Senator Patrick McCarran, commented
that "there was never anything before in this country more vital from the stand-
point of national development . . . than the legislation which is now pending
before this subcommittee, because we are dealing with an infant industry, and we
are dealing with it from the standpoint of what it can do for this country commer-
cially, industrially, and as an arm of national defence." Regulation of Interstate
Transportation of Passengers, Mail and Property by Aircraft: Hearings on S. 3187 Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
.1 "[Tihe nation was leery of relying on unrestrained competition to spur firms
to satisfy the public's needs." Bradley Behrman, Civil Aeronautics Board, in THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION 81 (James Q Wilson ed., 1980).
- Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973, repealed by Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 806.
Is, The name was changed to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in 1940.
4o 52 Stat. at 980.
4, Donald Pickrell, The Regulation and Deregulation of U.S. Airlines, in AIRLINE DE-
REGULATION: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 6 (KennethJ. Button ed., 1991). "After
'grandfathering' the route authority of the 16 airlines holding it in 1938, the CAB
precluded entry into service by new carriers, refusing nearly one hundred peti-
tions for new service between its establishment in 1938 and the onset of deregula-
tion in the mid-1970s." Id.
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"through complete or partial State-ownership of sched-
uled international airlines coupled with the regulatory
functions" of a government agency.4 2 This effectively al-
lows for direct government regulation from within. Until
recent privatization efforts, most countries in Europe had
airlines that were totally owned by national governments.
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom may be said
to have had a "mixed" system in that state-owned airlines
competed with privately owned airlines in a regulated
environment. 43
Foreign ownership of national airlines has been a sepa-
rate matter for national regulatory concern. Not only
have national airlines been protected through strict mar-
ket entry regulation and outright state ownership, but
regulations have also been widely developed to prohibit
the acquisition of ownership or control of existing airlines
by foreigners. In the United States, for example, the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958,44 which succeeded the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 and left its entry and route re-
strictions essentially untouched, provided that only a "cit-
izen" of the United States was able to own a United States
airline45 except under certain conditions set out in the
statute.46 The concern was that foreign airlines would be
less concerned with United States public welfare than
would national airlines. The fear of predatory competi-
tion was thereby extended to foreign airlines: there would
be prohibition not only of domestic competition with na-
tional airlines, i.e., cabotage, 47 but of acquisition or con-
42 HAANAPPEL, supra note 22, at 48.
41 See generally Pickrell, supra note 41.
44 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988).
45 Id. § 1301(3). The Federal Aviation Act defines "citizen," in respect of a cor-
poration, as amounting to no more than twenty-five percent foreign ownership.
Id. § 1301(16).
4, A foreign corporation may own an airline if it lawfully does business under
the laws of the United States and is based primarily in the United States. Id.
§ 1401(b)(ii) (West Supp. 1991).
47 Cabotage, often considered to be another freedom of the air, has been de-
scribed as "air transport between any two points in the same political unit, that is
to say, in the territory of a State as that term is used in air law." CHENG, supra note
12, at 314.
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trol of national airlines. The United States is not the only
country to impose ownership restrictions on its national
48carriers.
In a sense, unilateral regulation by national govern-
ments may be considered more a result than a source of
the problem of excessive regulation of international air
transport. National regulation in effect has been made to
fill out the regulatory framework established by multilat-
eral and bilateral agreements. But deregulating in a con-
sistent manner such a network of diverse national
legislation has nevertheless posed a formidable challenge.
One author suggested the magnitude of the task in ob-
serving that "[p]robably no other world-wide economic
activity of comparable magnitude is more thoroughly reg-
ulated, less free of official restraint and guidance, than is
world air transport. 49
III. RETREAT FROM REGULATION
Governments over time have varied in the extent and
the manner in which they have intervened in air transport
markets, but the tradition of regulation was well estab-
lished everywhere. A remarkable change in attitude has
occurred in recent years, however, which has resulted in a
withdrawal of the state from this interventionist role.
This process has been variously termed "deregulation,"
"liberalization," and "regulatory reform." But it was in
the United States that it found its impetus: "Deregulation
of air transport is first and foremost a U.S. experience." 0
Gradually, other countries' domestic air transport indus-
tries, and ultimately the international industry, felt the ef-
fects of the American experience. While the development
48 See, e.g., National Transportation Act, R.S.C., ch. 28 (3rd Supp.), §§ 67, 72
(1987) (Can.).
' Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Freedom of the Air: Scheduled and Non-scheduled Air Services, in
THE FREEDOM OF THE AIR 89 (Edward McWhinney & Martin A. Bradley eds.,
1968).
." Peter Haanappel, Deregulation of Air Transportation in North America and Western
Europe, in AIR WORTHY 89, 93 (J.W.E. Storm van's Gravesand & A. van der Veen
Vonk eds., 1985).
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of the regulatory framework for international air transport
proceeded from a multilateral basis through to national
legislation, its unravelling conversely began with national
legislation.
1. Deregulation of Domestic Air Transport
Deregulation in the United States was arguably inevita-
ble. As airlines expanded and matured, the need for their
protective regulation diminished. 5' By the mid-1970s,
this reduced need for regulation, combined with allega-
tions of unduly high fares, excessive profits, and allocative
inefficiencies, 52 contributed to a broadly-held laissez-faire
attitude in the United States that led to deregulation of
the domestic air transport industry. Although it has been
argued that de facto deregulation had begun earlier, the
process became official when Congress passed the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978. 53 The strict requirement of
"public convenience and necessity," which had served to
limit entry by new airlines and the routes of existing air-
lines since 1938, was abolished in favor of the essentially
pro forma requirement of "fit, willing and able." After
1983, domestic fare control was completely abolished,
and in 1984 the CAB itself was abolished, its remaining
functions transferred to the Department of
Transportation.
In the United States, then, airlines now operate domes-
tically in an essentially laissez-faire environment. Other
countries have merely relaxed their domestic air transport
regulations, more accurately referring to the process as
"regulatory reform" rather than "deregulation. ' 54 Typi-
.11 "Historically, aviation was a fledgling industry which needed help and finan-
cial guarantees, and the public needed controls for safety. But we're 40 years
from that point and there is no need for the CAB to be overly protective of a $100
billion industry." Rep. Norman Mineta, quoted in M. COHEN, REGULATORY REPORT
1559-66 (1975).
. Pickrell, supra note 41, at 7-8.
Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301
(West Supp. 1991)).
.1 See generally Peter Haanappel, Air Transport Deregulation in Jurisdictions other than
the United States, 13 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 79 (1988) (discussing deregulation in
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT
cally, the reforms have included privatization of state-
owned airlines, 55 the gradual removal of entry, pricing,
and capacity restrictions,56 and retention of government
authority to intervene in extraordinary cases. Restrictions
often still remain with respect to certain aspects of the
business as a matter of government policy.57 Still other
countries have made only minimal, if any, reforms to their
domestic regulatory structures.
2. Liberalization of International Air Transport
Domestic deregulation enjoyed initial success in the
United States. Now able to lower their fares, airlines "en-
courage[d] discretionary travelers to fill seats which might
otherwise have flown empty."'58 With higher profits the
result, there was satisfaction among consumers and air-
lines alike. 59 This success led the United States to begin
to export its policy of deregulation to international air
transport markets, recalling the "open skies" position
taken by the United States at the Chicago Convention.
The first step, in the late 1970s, was to designate a large
number of airlines to operate various international routes
under the existing Bermuda I-type bilateral agreements.
the United States and other jurisdictions); INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON PUBLIC
POLICY, PRIVATISATION AND DEREGULATION IN CANADA AND BRITAIN: PROCEEDINGS
OF A CANADA/UK COLLOQUIUM 118-122 (1987).
' Haanappel, supra note 54, at 96-97.
" For example, prior to the implementation of total freedom, the United King-
dom Civil Aviation Act of 1980 only went so far as to require the Civil Aviation
Authority, in its licensing activity, "to have regard in particular to any benefits
which may arise from enabling two or more airlines to provide the service in ques-
tion." Civil Aviation Act, 1980, ch. 60, § 12(4) (U.K.).
11 For example, Canada has retained a geographic distinction between the der-
egulated south and the still-regulated north. See generally Paul Dempsey, William
Thoms & Sonja Clapp, Canadian Transport Liberalization: Planes, Trains, Trucks &
Buses Rolling Across the Great White North, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 113, 115-42 (1990)
(describing Canadian regulation of various industries). And Australia only aban-
doned its "Two Airline Policy" in 1990 with a relaxation of market entry restric-
tions. See generally Peter Forsyth, The Regulation and Deregulation of Australia's
Domestic Airline Industry, in AIRLINE DEREGULATION: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES,
supra note 41, at 59-65.
' DEMPSEY, supra note 8, at 25.
Id. at 25-26.
6151992]
616 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [57
This was possible because the language of Bermuda I was
quite liberal with respect to designation and routes. 60 It
did not occur earlier because the CAB had, as a matter of
practice, previously opted to retain a rough parity with the
fewer foreign airlines available for designation by
designating only a few American airlines. 6' When, pursu-
ant to Bermuda I, the CAB designated several additional
United States airlines to operate new, previously dormant
routes to London from interior points in the United
States, the United Kingdom, citing an alleged imbalance
of benefits, denounced the agreement in 1976. The ensu-
ing negotiations resulted in the generally more restrictive
Bermuda II agreement, 62 by which capacity and frequency
were to be subject to approval prior to their implementa-
tion, and fifth freedom rights were to be diminished. 63
Bermuda II did not become the new model for bilateral
air transport agreements entered into by the United
States, however. The United States persisted in replacing
its traditional approach of obtaining equality of opportu-
nity for airlines with one that emphasized consumer bene-
fits. Accordingly, deregulation on international routes
continued through a series of so-called "liberal" bilateral
agreements which were subsequently negotiated, com-
mencing in 1978, with the Netherlands, Israel, Germany,
and Belgium. 64 These "new liberal bilaterals [were] char-
acterized by their opportunities for pricing flexibility, un-
restricted capacity, multiple designations [of airlines],
access to interior U.S. markets for foreign flag carriers,
some new fifth-freedom rights for U.S.-flag carriers, coun-
try of origin charter rules, and elimination of discrimina-
- Bermuda I permitted designation of an "air carrier or carriers for the speci-
fied route or routes." Bermuda I, supra note 27, art. 2(1).
- DEMPSEY, supra note 8, at 26.
w' Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland Concerning Air
Services, July 23, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367, T.I.A.S. No. 8641.
w. See generally Peter Haanappel, Bermuda I1: A First Impression, 2 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 139 (1977) (detailed analysis of the Bermuda II agreement). For an
enumeration of the five "freedoms of the air," see supra note 12.
- DEMPSEY, supra note 8, at 32.
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tion and unfair methods of competition. 65 With this type
of agreement providing the model, the plain objective of
the United States was to deregulate international air
transport on a broad scale. Success was only moderate,
however. While the approach succeeded in removing re-
strictions on competition for United States airlines in
much of northern Europe, it met with serious resistance in
southern Europe, much of Asia and most of Latin
America.66
At the same time, the CAB launched an assault on the
alleged cartel-like setting of international fares by IATA.
In 1979 it issued an order demanding that IATA "show
cause" why IATA fare-setting activities should continue to
receive immunity from United States anti-trust laws.6 v
Although the order was eventually withdrawn and the
proceedings terminated, the effects were significant.
Other countries reacted negatively, but IATA did in fact
re-examine its procedures and conduct a structural reor-
ganization. 68 The scope of its role in fare-setting is now
much reduced as a result.
These diverse initiatives suggest that the United States
effort to effect international deregulation utilized a piece-
meal approach, involving several agencies and depart-
ments and lacking coordination as a result. Arguably, it
never had the consistency or formulation that benefitted
domestic deregulation. 69 This, together with the general
international resistance to deregulation, led Congress to
pass the International Air Transportation Competition
Id. at 35 (citations omitted). See generally Naveau, supra note 23, at 149-52;
DEMPSEY, supra note 8, at 28-38.
- See MELVIN A. BRENNER, JAMES 0. LEET & ELIHU SCHOTr, AIRLINE DEREGULA-
TION 106-07 (1985).
7 C.A.B. Order No. 78-6-78 (1978).
" DEMPSEY, supra note 8, at 44-45 (detailing foreign response to the United
States' attempt to impose its aviation policies internationally); NAVEAU, sura note
23, at 152-55; see generally PATRICIA M. BARLOW, AVIATION ANTITRUST: THE EXTRA-
TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION 21-23 (1988) (discussing IATA's restructuring of its
traffic conference machinery as a result of the CAB "show cause" order).
11 NAVEAU, supra note 23, at 144.
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Act of 1979.70 Section 17 of that legislation set various
policy imperatives for international air transport, among
them "the strengthening of the competitive position of
United States air carriers," the "freedom of air carriers
and foreign air carriers to offer fares and rates which cor-
respond with consumer demand," and "the elimination of
operational and marketing restrictions to the greatest ex-
tent possible."'7 These mandates were to govern future
bilateral negotiations with a view to providing certainty
and consistency in the conduct of international air trans-
port policy by the United States.
Since the early 1980s, however, the United States has
not negotiated another full-scale liberal bilateral agree-
ment. This development is in part a result of the reduced
number of like-minded partners with whom to negotiate
liberal bilateral agreements. It is also a response to the
international resistance that United States liberalization
policies were meeting. Important developments have
been taking place recently, though. Many new bilateral
agreements continue to be negotiated which provide in-
cremental liberalization of air transport services.72 The
United States has extended offers, as yet unaccepted, to
the United Kingdom, France and Germany, to enter into
"open skies" agreements under which virtually all restric-
tions on bilateral air transport operations would be re-
moved. Furthermore, in April 1991, negotiations began
between Canada and the United States on such an agree-
,, Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C. (1988)).
71 Id. § 17, 94 Stat. at 42 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1502).
72 Since 1990, new bilateral agreements have been concluded between the
United States and the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Hungary,
Poland, the Soviet Union, Venezuela, Brazil; Singapore, and Trinidad and To-
bago. See Samuel K. Skinner, Globalizing the Aviation Marketplace, Address to
the British-American Chamber of Commerce (June 20, 1991) (Skinner, the United
States Secretary of Transportation, delivered the speech in London, England).
A significant liberalization development in the United Kingdom agreement is
the granting of so-called seventh freedom rights, such that, for example, British
Airways is able to operate directly from Frankfurt to New York with no require-
ment to first stop in London. See James Ott & Carole Shifrin, New Bilateral Gives
British Unprecedented Access to U.S., Av. WE. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 18, 1991, at 31.
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ment, which will possibly include the exchange of cabo-
tage rights.
The liberalization of international air transport has not
been driven exclusively by the United States, however.
Other parts of the world are also experiencing liberaliza-
tion of international air transport, albeit on a reduced
scale. Canada, for example, entered into liberal bilateral
agreements with the United Kingdom in 1987 and with
the Netherlands in 1988. Colombia and Venezuela con-
cluded an "open skies" agreement in early 1991. And
Mexico has instituted a number of "partial-liberalization"
measures aimed at attracting additional foreign airlines.73
Probably the most significant liberalization develop-
ments outside the United-States have taken place within
Europe. The United Kingdom led the way, concluding a
number of liberal bilateral agreements with other Euro-
pean countries notwithstanding Bermuda II; foremost
among these were agreements with Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany.74  These agree-
ments typically provided for a double disapproval mecha-
nism for fare-setting, as well as the dismantling of market
entry and capacity restrictions.7 5
More exciting, though, have been regional develop-
ments at the level of the European Community (EC). The
regulatory protection that has distinguished air transport
from other industries has perhaps been most evident in
the EC, an environment where so many other trade barri-
ers have fallen. 76 But the introduction of a common
71 See Mexico is Pursuing U.S. Airlines, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Feb. 1991, at 87.
74 See Werner Ebke & Georg Wenglorz, Liberalizing Scheduled Air Transport Within
the European Community: From the First Phase to the Second and Beyond, 19 TRANSP. L.J.
417, 424-25 (1991); R.K. Gardiner, United Kingdom Air Services Agreements 1970-
1980, 7 AIR L. 2, 5 (1982).
7- See Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 74, at 425.
7,1 "Today Phillips (sic), the Dutch electronics firm, can build a manufacturing
facility in Barcelona with relative ease. But if KLM Royal Dutch Airlines sought to
establish hub-and-spoke operations centered in Barcelona, the Spanish Air Force
would likely be scrambled to escort the KLM jets out of sovereign Spanish air-
space." Paul S. Dempsey, Aerial Dogfights Over Europe. The Liberalization of EEC Air
Transport, 53J. AIR L. & CoM. 615, 682 (1988).
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transport policy is expressly stated in the European Eco-
nomic Community Treaty as one of the means of estab-
lishing a common market,77 and substantial progress has
already been made toward the development of a common,
liberal air transport system within the EC.78 The EC
Commission set the course for a future common air trans-
port policy with its issuance of two documents: the so-
called First Memorandum (1979), 79 which proposed
broad implementation measures; and the more concrete
Second Memorandum (1984),80 which proposed the liber-
alization of existing bilateral agreements within the Com-
munity as well as the creation and regulation of a single
competitive market. The Council was slow to respond in
passing liberalization measures consistent with the Com-
mission's proposals, however, and the European Court of
Justice effectively took the lead in the Nouvelles Frontie'res
case,8 ' to date the most important decision relating to the
liberalization of EC air transport.82 In that decision, the
court held that the Community's antitrust laws 83 were ap-
plicable to civil aviation issues, such as discriminatory
77 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
3(e) 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 16 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. In addition, art. 84(2) grants
the EC Council the power to decide "whether, to what extent and by what proce-
dure appropriate provisions might be adopted for sea and air transport." Id. art.
84(2).
71 See generally Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 74 (analyzing the current state of
the movement to liberalize air transport deregulation within the EC); David Ba-
nowsky, Comment, Cutting Drag and Increasing Lift: How Well Will a More Competitive
EEC Air Transport Industry Fly?, 24 Irr'L LAw. 179 (1990) (comparison of the liber-
alization movement in the EC with the liberalization process in the United States);
J.M. Balfour, Freedom to Provide Air Transport Services in the EEC, 14 EUR. L.REv. 30
(1989) (addressing the EEC Treaty and its effect on the freedom in Air Transport
Services within the EC); Dempsey, supra note 76, at 615 (evaluating the current
trend toward the liberalization of air transport regulation).
7!, Air Transport: A Community Approach (Memorandum of the Commission),
COM(79)31 1 final, reprinted in BULL. EUR. Supp. May, 1979 (memorandum of the
EC Commission).
- Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2 - Progress Toward the Development of
Community Air Transport Policy, COM(84)72 final, 1984 O.J. (C 182) 1.
"1 Minist~re Public v. Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. 1425.
82 Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 74, at 431.
- EEC Treaty, supra note 77, arts. 85, 86.
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pricing." Actual and threatened enforcement proceed-
ings against EC airlines by the Commission resulted in the
airlines bringing their restrictive agreements concerning
tariffs, capacity, and pooling into compliance with EC an-
titrust laws. s5
The most important development for liberalization of
air transport in the EC, however, is surely the passage of
the Single European Act of 1987.86 In preparation for the
institution of the Single European Market on January 1,
1993, the EC Council has already passed, in two phases, a
number of liberalizing measures concerning market entry,
capacity sharing, tariff approval, and the application of an-
titrust provisions.8 7 There now exists, on a Community-
wide basis, a broad exchange of third and fourth freedom
rights within the Community, a right of multiple designa-
tion of airlines on certain high-density routes, and an ex-
tension of permissible capacity on fifth freedom routes.8 8
The EC has yet to take measures, however, which would
liberalize cabotage within the Community or international
air transport outside the Community.89
At a more universal multilateral level, discussions at the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) have included very broad service-related
issues.° ° It was initially contemplated that air transport
services generally would be covered, including the re-
moval of national barriers to trade and the incorporation
of countervailing and antidumping duties in respect of
14 Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. at 1466. This case addressed whether a travel agency had
the right to sell airline tickets below levels agreed to in an airline tariff agreement
approved by member states' governments. Id. at 1427.
'2 Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 74, at 433.
Single European Act, 1987 Oj. (L 169) 1.
17 See Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 74, at 434-452.
-8 Id. at 447-48. For an enumeration of the five "freedoms of the air," seesupra
note 12.
Id. at 449-50.
' Brian Hindley, Services, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND, A RESULTS-ORI-
ENTED APPROACH TO THE GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 130, 130-146 (Jeffrey J.
Schott ed., 1990). An independent agreement respecting services generally is pro-
posed, to be known as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Id.
at 130.
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government subsidies and unfair trade.91 But the latest
draft of the GATS Annexon Air Transportation Services
does not cover all transport beyond certain ancillary serv-
ices, such as aircraft handling and maintenance, and it is
unlikely that futher progress will be made in the liberaliza-
tion of the sector generally.92
3. An Assessment of Liberalization to Date
From this brief overview, it is clear that international
liberalization is taking place, though perhaps not by the
means or at the pace first envisaged by proponents of de-
regulation in the United States. Bilateral agreements con-
tinue to be the preferred vehicle, and progress, albeit
cautious and inconsistent, has occurred. But has liberali-
zation benefitted the economy? Should the process be
pursued? Analysis of the prospects for further liberaliza-
tion is rendered less relevant if these questions are an-
swered negatively.
The verdict to date is mixed. Deregulation has been ex-
perienced unevenly in various countries, and there have
been as many failures as successes. The successes never-
theless give rise to an expectation of additional benefits
for the air transport industry, and the failures provide les-
sons for those planning further liberalization. The results
of domestic deregulation have been documented most in
the United States, 93 and only a short summary is ventured
For example, the Concorde supersonic service offered by British Airways and
Air France would likely qualify as a countervailable subsidy. See DEMPSEY, supra
note 8, at 115.
11 See Draft Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/FA, at Annex II. The United States and
other developed countries have opposed the inclusion of air transport beyond
certain ancillary services in an MFN-based GAIT agreement, and its inclusion has
essentially been dropped from further consideration. See PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS ON THE EXTENSION OF FAST TRACK PROCEDURES, H.R. Doc. No. 51,
102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 56-57 (1991); Free Trade Prospects, AIRLINE Bus., Sept.
1991, at 93; and infra text accompanying note 151.
:1 See generally DANIEL KASPER, DEREGULATION AND GLOBALIZATION: LIBERALIZ-
ING TRADE IN INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES 27-42 (1988).
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here to reflect its impact on continued international
liberalization.
The elimination of entry, pricing, route, and other re-
strictions that had prevented or impaired competition
among United States airlines has radically transformed
the air transport industry in the United States. Several
new airlines entered the market shortly after the removal
of restrictions, but a rash of mergers, acquisitions, and
bankruptcies has resulted in a highly concentrated indus-
try now dominated by three megacarriers: American,
United, and Delta. In the absence of route restrictions,
airlines have sought to maximize efficiency by developing
extensive hub-and-spoke operations. The result has been
an increased concentration of operations by a single air-
line at a particular airport hub with, ironically, a corre-
sponding reduction in competition. Not surprisingly, new
carriers now find market entry a daunting proposition.
Consumers have generally benefitted from reduced fares
for discretionary travel between large points served by
more than one airline. Conversely, many allege that in
the process fares have become inconsistent, incompre-
hensible, and even discriminatory. Moreover, while some
maintain that safety has not been compromised as a result
of deregulation, 94 others argue that the intense competi-
tion unleashed by deregulation has deprived many air-
lines of the resources necessary to properly maintain their
aging fleets of aircraft. 95
The success of deregulation in the United States do-
mestic market has therefore been marred by excessive
concentration, destructive competition, and unfair pric-
ing. One commentator has concluded that "[a]fter dereg-
ulation, the big airlines found that by controlling traffic
flow, they could assume the Government's old power over
94 Skinner, supra note 72. "[B]ecause the Airline Deregulation Act left un-
touched the safety regulatory responsibilities of the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, it has never been safer to fly." Id.
w, Paul S. Dempsey, Airline Deregulation and Laissez-Faire Mythology: Economic The-
ory in Turbulence, 56J. AIR L. & CoM. 305, 372-79 (1990).
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fares and routes. 9 6 Not surprisingly, some critics have
therefore called for "reregulation" of the domestic air
transport industry, at least to the degree necessary to rid
the industry of the shortcomings of deregulation in small
markets where monopoly operations are the effective
rule.97 The underlying premise is that the air transport
industry has reached a level of maturity that merits a re-
laxation of economic controls in some respects, but not a
total elimination of these controls. 98 In any event, dereg-
ulation is undoubtedly well entrenched in the United
States domestic air transport industry, and there is cer-
tainly no going back to the kind of regulation that existed
twenty years ago. Other countries have been more cau-
tious in deregulating, but the changes are no less
profound.
While deregulation may have lasting effects in various
domestic markets, the process has not been as success-
fully transplanted to international markets. This is due in
large part to the differences in the nature of the two mar-
kets and the failure of the United States to take into ac-
count the international implications of its attempts to
unilaterally foist the exportation of deregulation. 99
The greatest shortcoming of international deregulation
derives from the essential nature of the international air
transport market itself. In reality, there is no one market.
Unlike the domestic air transport industry which functions
in a legally homogeneous environment, the international
industry must operate in several environments, each of
which has distinct national requirements and characteris-
tics. Foreign markets are different in size, number of
points to be served, and number of airlines. As more at-
tention began to be focused on international deregula-
-' Louis Uchitelle, Off Course, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 1, 1991, at 16.
, See Dempsey, supra note 95, at 379-85.
I' ld. at 398. "Much of what is wrong with deregulation is the fault of the im-
plementing agencies due to their zeal in embracing laissez-faire ideology." Id.
loo It has been suggested that the policy of the United States to achieve interna-
tional deregulation was nothing more than a transposition of the domestic Airline
Deregulation Act. See NAVEAU, supra note 23, at 145.
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tion, it met with resistence in many countries. The great
majority of foreign airlines were state-owned, and most
developing countries, at least, believed that "their fate, by
definition, [could not] be left to the free and occasionally
devastating forces of the marketplace."'' l0 Moreover,
states were at various stages of domestic deregulation, if
they had begun the deregulation process at all. Without a
common free-market standard, then, it was unrealistic to
expect universal receptiveness to deregulation at the in-
ternational level.' 0 ' The process was necessarily re-
stricted to a few like-minded states.
Another significant factor was the heavy-handedness
that characterized the United States' efforts to export de-
regulation, which was arguably a failure of process. The
clear intent was to impose the free-market principles of
United States domestic policy on a broad international ba-
sis through the bilateral process. This intent is evident,
for example, in the following excerpt from a CAB ruling:
The policy of our government is to trade liberalizations
rather than restrictions. . . The underlying premise is
that expansion of competitive opportunities for all carriers
- foreign as well as U.S. - benefits everyone, particularly
the consumer. This has been the domestic experience,
and it is equally applicable internationally, if governments
will allow.' 0 2
There is evidence, moreover, that this philosophy
persists. 103
The United States employed a variety of tactics to per-
suade foreign governments to "allow" liberalization, in-
cluding multiple designations under existing bilaterals,
-, Khaled Bitar, Airlines in Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT
ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL AVIATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 25 (1982).
-" The strongly regulated international air transport industry had functioned
successfully among variously regulated domestic markets because it had been ac-
cording to the "lowest common denominator," i.e., it had been consistent with
the level of regulation desired by the least liberal states.
1..2 C.A.B. Order No. 78-9-2 at 6 (1978)(The France Show Cause Order).
,,:' See Skinner, supra note 72. "Our goal must be to extend the benefits we in
the U.S. have enjoyed from deregulation to all the citizens of the world." Id.
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and even denunciation.1 4 One commentator has summa-
rized the approach as follows:
It was, indeed, nothing but arrogance on the part of
United States policy-makers who seriously planned to co-
erce, albeit by passive means, other nations of the world
into adoption of the United States policy. Preference of
this approach, instead of ... striving for a coordinated in-
ternational aviation policy through discussions with other
nations and with due respect to their rational, reasonable
and legitimate proposals and concerns, seems to have its
inspiration in the fact that the United States is the strong-
est aviation nation in the world.'05
As a result, many foreign governments opposed the
United States' international deregulation policy not only
for substantive reasons but also for the manner in which it
was implemented. The policy attempted to expand de-
regulation internationally through the multiplying effect
of liberal bilateral agreements, an "assumption remote
from reality."'' 6 In the final analysis, the policy achieved
a certain measure of liberalization of international air
transport, but the international air transport industry as a
whole was not sufficiently or uniformly mature in the early
1980s to accommodate deregulation on the scale that was
implemented domestically. Too many parts of the world
were simply not ready for either the extent or the manner
that liberalization of trade in air transport services was be-
ing proposed.
Europe, however, has taken a different approach to lib-
eralization. Without abandoning the bilateral process,
Europe seems to prefer to implement liberalization first
on a regional multilateral basis through the existing EC
infrastructure. The European approach is less ambitious
but more focused than that of the United States. For that
See DEMPSEY, supra note 8, at 36-37.
A.A. Majid, Recent I S. Aviation Policy: Need for Multilateralism Emphasized, CiTY
OF LONDON L. REV. 51, 62 (1984).
loo NAVEAU, supra note 23, at 146. "The strategy followed rested on the simplis-
tic presumption that a multilateral system can be modifed by a sufficient number of carefully
selected bilateral actions." Id. (emphasis in original)
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reason, it may be the most appropriate means to over-
come the factors that continue to block further
liberalization.
IV. PROTECTIONISM: THE BARRIER TO
FURTHER LIBERALIZATION
Protectionism, the bane of free trade generally, is an
outgrowth of the principle of sovereignty. When sover-
eignty was incorporated into international air law to gov-
ern relations between states concerning use of their
airspace, it engendered a number of non-tariff trade barri-
ers to air transportation between and within states. Citi-
zenship requirements of airlines were imposed, for
example, such that only national "flag" carriers could op-
erate domestically within a state. States even prohibited
foreign flag carriers from providing direct service to a
state. While bilaterally-authorized operations were rou-
tinely negotiated, they were usually subject to severe re-
strictions and the foreign airlines often found themselves
subject to discriminatory practices and charges. These re-
strictions persist today in varying degrees and evidence a
formidable conceptual barrier to the further liberalization
of international air transport.
It has been said that "[c]ivil [a]viation has become a
part of the 'face' of the State."'' 0 7 Airlines represent the
most tangible means by which that face can be shown to
the world. As a result, states have taken an exceptional
interest in molding "their" airlines through subsidization,
regulatory protection, and often outright ownership. The
reasons for this special treatment of airlines are many and
varied.
Foremost is the fact that air transportation quickly de-
veloped into an important infrastructure industry. States
came to attach an important public policy role to airlines
for the purpose of publicly available transportation, eco-
107 Henri A. Wassenbergh, Regulatory Reform - A Challenge to Intergovernmental
Civil Aviation Conferences, 11 AIR L. 31, 31 (1986).
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nomic development, and even national unity, a position
that was firmly advanced during the debates of the Chi-
cago Conference.108 As a result, air transportation is typi-
cally characterized as a public utility industry. 0 9 Most
public utilities (communications, community services,
etc.) are operated by the state itself, or by a strictly regu-
lated monopoly or oligopoly of private operators. Air-
lines are no exception: state operation is the model for
most of western Europe, while government regulation
prevails in the United States." '
Another reason for giving airlines special treatment is
national security; many states depend upon the airlift ca-
pacity of their airlines to meet military air transportation
requirements during times of crisis."' Safety is yet an-
other reason. States often impose strict ownership re-
quirements as a means of exercising control over
airlines."12  Finally, there is what might be called the
"prestige" factor. "Since international aviation provides
ample opportunities to 'show the flag' around the world,
it has from the outset been viewed as enhancing the pres-
tige of states." '" 3 Particularly for small developing coun-
l," For example, Adolf Berle, the Representative of the United States and
Chairman of the Conference, stated: "It is the view of the United States that each
country should, as far as possible, come to control and direct its own internal air
lines. In the long view, no country will wish to have its essential internal commu-
nications under the domination of any save their own nationals." UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, I PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
CONFERENCE 49, 61-62 (1948).
1w International air transport has even been described as a "world public util-
ity." See K.G.J. PILLAI, THE AIR NET: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD AVIATION
CARTEL 2 (1969).
, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom follow a mixed system in which
public and private carriers compete under strict regulation. See HAANAPPEL, supra
note 22, at 48.
"1 Israel's reliance on El Al aircraft and crews is a prime example. The United
States and other countries maintain a Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program
which induces voluntary commitment of aircraft and crews for emergency national
airlift requirements, the most recent prominent example being the deployment of
troops to Saudi Arabia for the Gulf War.
112 ChristerJ6nsson, Sphere of Flying: The Politics of International Aviation, 35 INT'L
ORG. 273, 279 (1981). "Governments everywhere regarded the safety of air trans-
port operations to be their special concern and responsibility ..... Id. at 278.
,,3 Id. at 279.
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tries, airlines have come to symbolize the equality of
states in an international setting. All of these factors have
contributed to a philosophy of state intervention in the
airline marketplace, usually at the price of efficient
operations.
The question arises as to exactly how a state ensures
that an airline is "its" airline for the purposes mentioned
above. The answer is found in airline ownership restric-
tions, which constitute the core of protectionism in the air
transport industry. Where states have not directly as-
sumed ownership of airlines, they have stipulated in their
national legislation that, for the purpose of domestic op-
erations, ownership and control must be in the hands of
their nationals. While a minimum of fifty-one percent na-
tional ownership meets a strict reading of this require-
ment, states have more typically required a minimum
national ownership of seventy-five percent. 1 4  At the
same time, states have also used bilateral agreements to
ensure that other states are restricted in designating air-
lines for international operations airlines having "sub-
stantial ownership" and "effective control" in the hands
of nationals of those other states. The rationale behind
these agreements was to prevent a situation in which an
airline, deprived of legitimate ties to a state or nationals of
that state, could still benefit from rights obtained by that
state. ' I
These actions served to imbue airlines with a sense of
"nationality."" 6  "Airlines would not be multinational
corporations . . .in terms of ownership or organization,
but would be owned by the state or citizens of the state
"1 See, e.g., supra note 45 (definition of "citizen" in the Federal Aviation Act).
" Prompted also by a wartime concern of the need to know with whom you are
dealing at all times, participants at the Chicago Convention considered including
a national ownership clause for airlines. The clause was ultimately included in the
Transit and Transport Agreements, and was subsequently rendered bilateral in
the Bermuda I agreement. See Bermuda I, supra note 27.
1...See generally Z. Joseph Gertler, Nationality of Airlines: A Hidden Force in the Inter-
national Air Regulation Equation, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 51 (1982) (discussing the de-
velopment of airline nationality since World War II).
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whose flag they flew."' 7 It is not surprising, then, that
states have taken a more paternalistic, protectionist ap-
proach in their regulation of airlines. This approach has
been reflected in the exclusion of foreign airlines from
domestic markets. It has been evident in bilateral agree-
ments authorizing foreign airlines to operate interna-
tional routes but also containing broad restrictions on
market entry, routes, pricing, and capacity. And it has
even been found in states' discriminatory policies and reg-
ulations governing related ancillary industries. Providers
of airport facilities, ground handling, and airline ticketing
services, for example, are often government-owned or
protected, with the result that foreign airlines have been
subject to bias in treatment, fees, and charges."'
Protectionism has therefore been a distorting force in
international air transport markets. Lacking the right to
enter foreign domestic markets and to operate freely and
fairly in international markets, otherwise efficient airlines
have found it difficult to compete on a broad international
scale. Moreover, the barriers go beyond the express re-
strictions in national regulations and bilateral agree-
ments; they have become embedded in many countries'
national economic, political and legal fabrics. The con-
sumer ultimately pays for these inefficiencies.
The United States has led efforts to export deregulation
through selected bilateral agreements. These efforts have
produced a certain measure of liberalization of trade in air
transport services. Most of the potential gains from that
process have already been realized, however. It seems
It Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A New Take-Off For International Air Transport, 54 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 36, 39 (1975).
'I Among the examples of discriminatory practices against foreign airlines are
higher costs for landing fees and fuel; requirements that local passenger and bag-
gage handling personnel be employed; problems in obtaining access to landing
and take-off slots at high-density airports; bias in computer reservations systems;
and currency conversion and remittance problems. See BRENNER, LEET & SCHOr,
supra note 66, at 109 n.84 (discussing governmental use of airlines for economic
gain in trade, currency, and tourism); DEMPSEY, supra note 8, at 111-19; and KAs-
PER, supra note 93, at 64-69 (describing discrimination and unfair competition
against foreign carriers).
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clear that the traditional sovereignty-centered, protection-
ist philosophy which has found form in the nationality of
airlines must change for further liberalization to occur.
"National interest" must be redefined in the context of air
transport to comprise fair competition, airline ownership
not restricted to the nationals of any one state, and open
air links with the rest of the world. Many have accordingly
called for fresh approaches - unilateral, bilateral or mul-
tilateral - that take into account a new "de-nationalized"
philosophy of international air transport." l 9 But limita-
tions remain on the process of international liberalization,
not only as to how far it should go' 20 but also as to how
far it can go under current legal and political conditions.
The means to give effect to further liberalization are im-
portant in this regard.
V. TOWARD FURTHER LIBERALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT
While the regulation of international air transport pro-
ceeded rather systematically from its initial basis in state
sovereignty, the array of regulatory restrictions cannot be
so easily dismantled. The United States has already
learned this lesson. In all likelihood, further liberalization
will require a consolidated approach through a broad ap-
plication of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral
measures.
1. Unilateral Measures
Trade barriers are not ordinarily removed without
some form of reciprocity, which usually finds expression
in bilateral or multilateral agreements. States may, how-
, I, NAVEAU, supra note 23, at 104. "[C]onsideration should be given once more
to multilateral exchanges of traffic rights, along with some de-politisation and de-
nationalisation of the treatment of the airline industry." Id.
1'2" Gertler, supra note 116, at 88. "It is not always easy to distinguish between
the right protectionism, aimed at ensuring or restoring necessary conditions for
orderly airline operations, and the wrong protectionism, which jeopardizes the
smooth flow of international air commerce and air transportation services." Id.
(citations omitted).
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ever, occasionally take unilateral steps toward liberaliza-
tion of international air transport either to encourage
similar steps on the part of other governments or, more
likely, because it is in their own interest. One such exam-
ple in the United States is the so-called "cities program,"
which grants, under certain circumstances, extra-bilateral
authority to foreign airlines to operate to United States
cities that do not already have direct service from that air-
line's homeland. Another is the proposed relaxation of
foreign ownership restrictions on national airlines, a
"concession" to liberalization favored by United States
airlines seeking new sources of capital.' 2 ' As a result, leg-
islation is now before Congress that would amend the
Federal Aviation Act to increase the maximum level of
foreign ownership from twenty-five percent to forty-nine
percent when an airline is in danger of failing for lack of
capital. 122
Nevertheless, the principal trade barriers to interna-
tional air transport, such as restrictions on market entry,
will necessarily be dealt with between states on a bilateral
or possibly multilateral basis. Even secondary issues, such
as discrimination and anticompetitive conduct, will ordi-
narily be first taken up bilaterally with the foreign airline,
airport authority, or government department responsi-
ble. 23 If, however, resolution of the problem cannot be
achieved within a reasonable time, the aggrieved airline
can seek the involvement of its own government through
the unilateral imposition of trade remedies. As one com-
mentator has noted:
[T]he bilateral exchange of traffic rights and related provi-
sions are negotiated with an eye on the interests of carri-
ers which are predestined designated carriers under such a
bilateral agreement. This government concern does not,
1' See Airline Industry Wants Sky Open for Foreign Partnerships, INSIGHT, Feb. 4,
1991, at 42.
'2 H.R. 782, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
,2 Many modern bilateral agreements include provisions designed to protect
airlines designated by one contracting party from unfair or discriminatory prac-
tices of the other party. See Gertler, supra note 116, at 86.
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however, end at the moment the negotiations are con-
cluded. During the time of actual application of the agree-
ment, governments monitor and intervene in various
forms as necessary to ensure for national carriers the best
possible conditions for the operations of their services.
This includes the protection of national carriers from
measures of foreign governments or other bodies which
could be viewed as unfair, unjust or discriminatory. 124
Unilateral trade remedies can therefore be an impor-
tant tool in ensuring fair competition in the provision of
international air transport services. 125 They have already
been successfully used in the past. For example, action
can be brought in foreign courts to seek injunctive relief
or simply to put pressure on the offending airline or gov-
ernment. 26 Special legislation can be promulgated do-
mestically which will enable administrative or legal action
against uncompetitive practices. 2 7 Remedies already ex-
isting in general trade legislation can be applied to the air
transport industry. 2 8 Similarly, remedies for anticompe-
titive behavior exist in antitrust law, most prominently ap-
plied by the United States against the alleged cartel-
124 Id. at 80-81.
12-5 See generally DEMPSEY, supra note 8, at 167-229 (discussion of unilateral trade
remedies in the United States); and E. ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH U.S. LEGISLATION (1985).
1' This was the case when the United States brought legal action against the
United Kingdom before local British courts with respect to a landing fees dispute
at Heathrow Airport. See DEMPSEY, supra note 8, at 167 n.l.
127 For example, the International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979
permits suspension without hearing of a foreign airline's operating authority
where that airline's government denies operating rights to U.S. carriers or permits
its carriers to engage in unfair, discriminatory, or restrictive practices with a sub-
stantial adverse impact upon United States carriers. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1372(f)(2)
(West Supp. 1991).
12 While the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) does not yet
provide for countervailing and antidumping duties to be applied to services which
are subsidized or offered at less than fair value, some countries have unilaterally
legislated general trade remedies. In the United States, for example, section 301
of the Tariff Act of 1930, is available to retaliate for "unfair trade practices,"
which in the context of air transport could include violation of a bilateral agree-
ment or a practice which is unjustifiable, unreasonable or constitutes a burden on
international services offered by United States airlines. Tariff Act of 1930, § 301,
19 U.S.C. 2411 (1988).
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pricing practices of IATA in 1981.29 Finally, states have
the ultimate weapon of unilaterally denouncing current
bilateral agreements, a calculated threat which carries the
often costly risk that international air service between the
two countries involved will be terminated altogether.' 30
These unilateral measures are arguably too isolated to
have a significant effect in the global liberalization of air
transport services. But their strategic utilization by states
having international clout can effectively supplement
larger bilateral or multilateral initiatives.
2. Bilateral Measures
Bilateral efforts to further liberalize trade in interna-
tional air transport seem attractive for a number of rea-
sons. Bilaterals have become the universally accepted
means of enabling the operation of air services on an in-
ternational basis; it makes sense to liberalize operations
by the same method. In addition, like-minded partners in
a bilateral agreement can progress to a degree that could
not be achieved among many diverse states in a multilat-
eral agreement. Also, because bilaterals are restricted to
two parties, states can afford to undertake liberalization
on an experimental basis.
Therein also lies the limitation of bilateral agreements,
however. They can only have broad application to the ex-
tent that their provisions are accepted by states generally,
and it is probably too much to expect all states to have a
similar philosophy. The generally stymied efforts of the
United States to export deregulation on a broad scale
through the bilateral process offer evidence of this. An
international system with its foundation in a multilateral
"2S See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
11" The most prominent example is the United Kingdom's denunciation in 1976
of Bermuda I over a dispute over perceived inequities, which effectively forced
renegotiation with the United States of Bermuda II. More recently, a dispute be-
tween Canada and the United Kingdom resulted in Canada's denunciation in
1988 of the International Air Services Transit Agreement, supra note 18, thereby
depriving British access to valuable Canadian airspace and also effectively forcing
negotiation of a new bilateral agreement.
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convention, albeit implemented by bilateral agreements,
simply cannot be modified at the instance of one state,
however powerful, when that state stands essentially
alone.
For liberalization to occur on a broad scale through the
bilateral process, two factors must be present. First, there
must exist a similar free-market philosophy for airlines on
the part of the two bargaining states, and this philosophy
must have wide currency. If one state persists in viewing
its airline or airlines as essential public utilities deserving
of government protection, then liberalization of interna-
tional air transport services with that state is essentially a
nonstarter. Second, there must also exist a rough parity
in bargaining position between the two states, both in
terms of what benefits they can offer when trade barriers
are removed and in the strength of their airlines. For ex-
ample, any one country would have difficulty in matching
the large market and powerful airlines of the United
States, and would naturally resist the relaxation of restric-
tions in its bilateral. In this regard, one commentator has
observed:
[T]he freedom of the air the United States has long advo-
cated under the Bermuda principles is a special kind of
freedom: the freedom of the stronger (in terms of traffic
generating capability and bargaining power) to freely
compete with the weaker. This Darwinian notion of free-
dom has understandably not set well with that large body
politic of countries which together comprise the category
of the "weaker." Like weaker species in nature, these
countries have fought back with whatever weapons they
happened to have at hand. I3'
By the same token the United States would resist ex-
tending access to its large market in return for similar ac-
cess to a small market.
Accordingly, it must be concluded that further liberali-
zation of international air transport on a broad scale
'.' Barry R. Diamond, The Bermuda Agreement Revisited: A Look at the Past, Present
and Future of Bilateral Air Transport Agreements, 41J. AIR L. & COM. 419, 462 (1975).
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through the bilateral process will be limited. The United
States appears to have realized most of its potential gains
and, without the ability to offer access to an equally attrac-
tive market, other states will not likely be able to match
those gains. Moreover, if a common desire to enter into
liberal air transport arrangements did widely exist, a net-
work of bilateral agreements would hardly be the most ef-
ficient means to give it effect. The bilateral system, with
its emphasis on traffic between two countries or even two
cities, simply does not jibe with a more global basis for the
conduct of air transport services.
This is not to say that no further liberalization is possi-
ble or desirable under bilaterals, however. A number of
markets, by virtue of their size and maturity, are possibly
amenable to very liberal bilateral agreements, continuing
the limited process of liberalization already in progress.
For example, the current discussions between the United
States and Canada - each the other's largest foreign mar-
ket - have as their goal the replacement of the obsolete
and restrictive bilateral agreement of 1966.112 A number
of issues are being addressed, including liberal provisions
regarding routes, pricing and capacity, fifth freedom
rights, cabotage, access to high-density airports, and an-
cillary matters such as fair use of computer reservations
systems. A notable exception is foreign ownership.
Of these, cabotage, an issue central to the question of
further liberalization generally, requires special consider-
ation in the context of bilateralism. The concept has al-
ready been criticized in both Canada13 3 and the United
States134 on policy grounds, but its legal basis has also
11 See generally Peter Haanappel, Bilateral Air Transport Agreements Between Canada
and the U.S.A., 5 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 133 (1980); Martin Dresner, Carolyn
Hadrovic & Michael Tretheway, The Canada-U.S. Air Transport Bilateral: Will It Be
Freed?, 56 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 393 (1989).
". Geoffrey Rowan, What price open skies?, TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 13,
1991, at BI.
'.1 Paul Cohan, Labor Clashes With Cabotage, AIRLINE EXECUTIVE INT'L, June 1991,
at 29.
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been publicly questioned. i3 5 Specifically, the issue lies in
Article 7 of the Chicago Convention, which grants a state
"the right to refuse permission to the aircraft of other
contracting States to take on in its territory passengers,
mail and cargo carried for remuneration or hire and des-
tined for another point within its territory. "136 Most
countries have specifically prohibited cabotage, 3 7 with
the result that today only national airlines carry domestic
traffic. But Article 7 also prohibits cabotage from being
granted at all to foreign airlines, where it is done "specifi-
cally ...on an exclusive basis."'' 38 A strict reading of
these words suggests that if the right of cabotage within a
state is to be extended by that state, then it must be of-
fered on a non-discriminatory basis to all states. The ef-
fect of such a reading would be to preclude cabotage
between Canada and the United States or any other states
who may choose to consider a bilateral, or less-than-uni-
versal multilateral,' 39 exchange of such a right - a clear
setback to liberalization of air transport.
By emphasizing the words "on an exclusive basis," this
strict interpretation of Article 7 would effectively consti-
tute a most-favored-nation clause: each state party shall
- Cecil Foster, Open skies threatened, THE FIN. POST, Oct. 26, 1990, at 1.
Chicago Convention, supra note 9, art. 7.
137 For example, section 1108(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 prohibits
foreign airlines from transporting persons, property and mail for compensation
between two points in the United States. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L.
No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, 798 (1958) (current version at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(b)
(West Supp. 1991).
' The full text of Article 7 reads:
Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission to
the aircraft of other contracting States to take on in its territory pas-
sengers, mail and cargo carried for remuneration or hire and des-
tined for another point within its territory. Each contracting State
undertakes not to enter into any arrangements which specifically
grant any such privilege on an exclusive basis to any other State or
an airline of any other State, and not to obtain any such exclusive
privilege from any other State.
Chicago Convention, supra note 9, art. 7.
I' See infra text accompanying notes 152-64 (discussing regional multilaterals).
For a discussion of cabotage in the context of the European Community, see San E.
de Groot, Cabotage Liberalization in the European Economic Community and Article 7 of the
Chicago Convention, 14 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 139 (1989).
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be treated no less favorably than any other state. But the
word "specifically" creates ambiguity, and a counter-argu-
ment can be made. By placing emphasis on this word in-
stead, the resulting liberal interpretation would allow
cabotage rights to be granted on an exclusive basis to a
state so long as the grant does not specifically stipulate
that the rights are exclusive to that state. 40 Such inter-
pretation is arguably consistent with the bilaterally-based
air *transport regime contemplated under Article 6 of the
Chicago Convention.' 4' Moreover, the principle of sover-
eignty over national airspace, so entrenched in interna-
tional air law, could have no real meaning if a grant of
cabotage to the airlines of one state resulted in a deluge
of airlines from other states. In any event, no state has
ever objected in the few cases since 1944 in which cabo-
tage has been granted, suggesting that customary interna-
tional law has provided the definitive interpretation. 42 It
is therefore likely that Article 7 does not act to prevent the
1" Cheng, supra note 12, at 315.
There is no doubt that the grant and receipt of cabotage rights on a
non-exclusive basis are permitted by the Convention. But the word-
ing would seem to permit even the grant and receipt of cabotage
rights on an exclusive basis, provided that it is not "specified" in the
agreement that these are exclusive rights. The net result is that
States remain free to do what they like as long as they do not claim
specifically that the privilege they are granting or receiving is
exclusive.
ld.
'' de Groot, supra note 139, at 158.
[A] strict reading of the provision [Article 7] is contrary to the spirit
of the Chicago Convention and to the nature of the industry, both of
which result from acceptance of the doctrine of national sovereignty
over airspace. The bilateral framework of exchanging traffic rights
would make any form of MFN-treatment an anomaly in international
aviation.
Id.
42 In this regard, see Article 31, paragraph 3(b) of the Vienna Convention of
the Law of Treaties which states: "There shall be taken into account [for the pur-
pose of the interpretation of a treaty], together with the context ... any subse-
quent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of
the parties regarding its interpretation." Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, § 3(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340. Butsee de Groot, supra
note 139, at 162 (noting that silence on behalf of a party may indicate a lack of
interest rather than tacit acceptance).
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grant of exclusive cabotage rights on a bilateral or limited
multilateral basis.
The prospects for bilateralism as a liberalizing force in
international air transport therefore remain positive. It is
also possible that bilateralism can be combined with mul-
tilateralism to achieve favorable results. As the European
Community moves to create a single market in 1993,143 it
may be that a liberal "bilateral" agreement can be con-
cluded with the United States that substitutes cabotage
within the Community for the limited and unwieldy fifth
freedom rights that the United States has traditionally
sought. 44 But the nature of bilateralism is such that pro-
gress will be quite limited, both in terms of the extent of
further liberalization (cabotage being a significant excep-
tion) and also in the number of states with whom it can be
negotiated. It also bears repeating that state sovereignty
is the basis for protectionism by states, and bilateral
agreements are a manifestation of that attitude. Indeed,
bilaterals reinforce the concept of sovereignty and have
accordingly become entrenched in the mindset of states
as the means of regulating international air transport.
3. Multilateral Measures
Liberalization of international air transport through
multilateralism, used here to refer to a universal regime
encompassing all the nations of the world, is likely no
more achievable now than it was at Chicago in 1944. One
commentator described the differences that undermined
efforts to arrive at a multilateral air transport agreement
at Chicago as follows: "While the U.S. delegation sought
to use a multilateral convention essentially to 'codify' a
free market ethic, other nations saw a multilateral agree-
ment as a way to ensure that the robust U.S. airline indus-
14-1 On the effect of the move to create a single market, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 76-89.
,4 See Paul Proctor, Legalizing Cabotage Could Help U.S. Airline Industry, Passengers,
Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 24, 1990, at 62. For an enumeration of the five
"freedoms of the air," see supra note 12.
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try would not monopolize international civil aviation."'' 45
This comment equally describes the situation today.
Then, as now, the different degrees of economic develop-
ment and associated economic policies of countries make
it unrealistic to expect agreement on a universal set of
rules to govern international air transport.146
Based as it must be on a lowest-common-denominator
approach which, in order to achieve universality, essen-
tially cannot go beyond the level of liberalization desired
by the most protectionist states, a multilateral agreement
simply has little chance at this time of being liberalized to
a significant degree. And many less developed states re-
main protective of their airlines for traditional policy and
prestige reasons. 47 So long as states continue to pursue
their national interests in this regard (as the principle of
sovereignty permits them to do), then the resulting inter-
national conflicts will prevent the conclusion of a broadly-
based multilateral agreement that goes much beyond the
Chicago-based instruments.
The suggestion has been made from time to time that
ICAO might assume a more significant role in the multi-
lateral regulation of international air transport. 48 In fact,
two Special Air Transport Conferences were convened by
ICAO in 1977 and 1980 to deal with the perceived crisis
in international air transport but failed to make any pro-
gress whatsoever toward possible solutions. 14 9 Develop-
ing countries voted as a bloc against all liberalization
proposals for fear that their national airline industries
14. L. Gilles Sion, Multilateral Air Transport Agreements Reconsidered. The Possibility of
a Regional Agreement Among North Atlantic States, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 155, 174 (1981).
146 "[The] difficulties emanate from ... the different aeronautical potential of
each country, from the variations found when considering each country as a
source of traffic, from the varying importance of each country in international air
transport, according to its climatic or geographic conditions .. " Development of a
Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in International Civil Air Transport, at 46,
ICAO Doc. 4510, A-1-EC/72 (1947).
,17 See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
-4' See LOWENFELD, supra note 12, at 5-110.
-, NAVEAU, supra note 23, at 142. "The international community was unques-
tionably divided on main issues, except on one point: that the adequacy of interna-
tional air transport was in question." Id. (emphasis in original)
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would be threatened. 50 The principle of "one state, one
vote," combined with the differences among states that
persist today, poses enormous difficulties for ICAO, but
there is arguably no other forum better-suited to the task
of achieving liberalization on a multilateral basis. In any
event, ICAO remains an essential organization for techni-
cal and economic cooperation. Even if bilateralism and
regionalism prevail as the preferred means to liberalize
international air transport, development on that basis can
take place in a more prudent and balanced manner if car-
ried out within a wider forum such as ICAO.
Questions also exist as to whether the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATF) provides a suitable
mechanism for the multilateral liberalization of trade in
air transport services. Although air services have been the
subject of preliminary discussion during the Uruguay
Round of talks,' 5' many hold the view that general trade
principles are simply not appropriate for a field as special-
ized as air transport. In fact, close analysis of the key
GATT principles of unconditional MFN and national
treatment reveals that GATT could actually impede rather
than enhance further liberalization of air transport.
The essence of GATT is non-discrimination. The MFN
rule in Article I requires that any concession granted to a
member state be extended to all other member sta tes. In
a GATT regime that includes air transport services, there-
fore, a state would be required to grant to all member
states the same degree of access to its market, regardless
of whether that state's airlines had access to other mar-
kets. Given the disparity of air transport markets, how-
ever, it is simply not reasonable to expect this outcome.
States with small markets would await concessions in
larger, more lucrative markets, and would have no incen-
For example, proposals for agreement on the double-disapproval principle
of pricing were rejected in a resolution that expressly approved and encouraged
continued use of the IATA fare-setting machinery. See LOWENFELD, supra note 12,
at 5-112.
-1 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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tive themselves to liberalize. On the other hand, states
with large markets would also be averse to extending con-
cessions until they undertook the daunting task of ascer-
taining the net benefits of allowing greater access to all
member states. Thus, the MFN non-discrimination prin-
ciple undermines even the limited liberalization that may
have been derived from bilateral agreements.
Similarly, the national treatment rule in Article III of
the GATT would require foreign suppliers of air trans-
port services to receive the same treatment as comparable
domestic suppliers. States having sizeable, deregulated
domestic markets, such as the United States, would natu-
rally balk at permitting non-discriminatory access to those
markets (i.e., cabotage) to airlines from states whose own
domestic markets remained strictly regulated. The na-
tional treatment principle therefore has the effect of dis-
couraging more liberal-minded states from deregulating
their domestic markets, yet of doing nothing to encourage
less liberal-minded states to act similarly.
GATT may yet have a role to play in the liberalization
of international air transport services. But it is likely that
any success will be less in the area of "hard" economic
rights, such as routes, fares and capacity, and more in the
area of "soft" ancillary rights, such as ground handling,
aircraft maintenance and computer reservations systems.
A specialized multilateral instrument therefore remains
more suited to the peculiarities of the air transport serv-
ices sector, and thus better developed under the auspices
of ICAO. But a multilateral liberal air transport agree-
ment will be unattainable until a large majority of states
becomes more like-minded as to the degree of liberaliza-
tion to be instituted.
4. A Regional Approach
The complex web of bilateral agreements and associ-
ated implementation problems has proved too unwieldy
for significant progress in the broad liberalization of inter-
national air transport. At the same time, a broad-based
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liberal multilateral agreement has been plagued by the
lowest-common-denominator problem inherent in a
world of diverse states, many of whom remain stubbornly
protectionist. The most appropriate means of achieving
liberalization in the current world air transport environ-
ment may therefore be a compromise regional approach.
By focusing on a smaller group of countries having rela-
tively open, unregulated air transport markets, the
problems of both bilateralism and universal multilateral-
ism could be substantially mitigated. Such an approach, if
targeted initially to certain major air transport powers
having or expressing an intent to have a liberal regime,
could provide the basis for the development of other such
liberal regional "trading blocs." A more universal multi-
lateral regime may then be within reach.
Regional multilateralism is by no means a new idea.
When in 1946 the Provisional ICAO attempted unsuc-
cessfully to revive the idea of a universal multilateral air
transport agreement, one opponent nevertheless spoke
out in favor of a regime that would transcend bilateralism:
"The application of [the] principle of international coop-
eration and ... representation would be easier, if we con-
sider the application by regions rather than by the entire
world."1 52 In 1953, the ICAO Assembly again briefly dis-
cussed and dismissed a concept of regional joint ventures
under the label of "plurilateralism."'153 In 1980, the
Netherlands proposed a "plurilateral" agreement that
would have provided for selective liberalization of air
transport services among like-minded states.154 That pro-
1-12 Discussion on the Development of a Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in
International Civil Air Transport, at 26, PICAO Doc. 2089 EC/57 (1946) (statement
of the Representative of the United Kingdom).
'" See Knut Hammarskjold, One World or Fragmentation: The Toll of Evolution in
International Air Transport, 9 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 79, 87 (1984). ICAO did fol-
low up on this initiative, however, by subsequently establishing a regional Euro-
pean branch of the Organization to deal with economic developments in regional
air transport. This was the origin of the European Civil Aviation Conference, cre-
ated in 1954. Id.
,.4 See generally Henri A. Wassenbergh, A New Plurilateral Approach to International
Air Transport Regulation, in INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT IN THE EIGHTIES 205 (H.
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posal failed to attract interest, however, due in large part
to the concern of other European countries that by open-
ing their markets they had more to lose than the Nether-
lands, a small country with a large, competitive airline.151
But exciting developments at the regional level are in
fact now occurring in various parts of the world. The EC,
of course, is the most prominent example. 56  In the
march toward a single market, considerable progress has
been made in the removal of intra-Community restric-
tions in respect of market entry, pricing, and capacity. 57
Difficult obstacles remain, however. The lack of a single
Community-wide infrastructure - respecting, for exam-
ple, regulation of safety, provision of air traffic control
services, and coordinated airport access - has contrib-
uted to the decision of the EC Council to delay the intro-
duction of cabotage rights and the exchange of air
transport rights with states outside the Community.'58
But discussions to facilitate these steps are also in pro-
gress. For example, member states have been working to-
ward the establishment of a single EC civil aviation
regulatory authority according to harmonized civil avia-
tion standards.
Less advanced, but no less encouraging, regional devel-
opments have also been occurring elsewhere. For exam-
ple, the Andean Pact countries of Colombia, Venezuela,
Wassenbergh & H.P van Feneman eds., 1981); K. Veenstra, The "Plurilateral Air
Transport Agreement ": A Draft for a Better Regulatory Instrument, in INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT IN THE EIGHTIES, supra at 159.
K" RASPER, supra note 93, at 56.
'151 See supra text accompanying notes 76-89.
,.7 But see Carole A. Shifrin, Liberalized European Air Transport Market Will Not Yield
Benefits of U.S. Deregulation, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 24, 1990, at 63 (stating
that the European single market is unlikely to produce the same benefits and op-
portunities for consumers and entrepreneurs that United States deregulation
produced).
'.5 The Commission in its liberalization proposals had sought the implementa-
tion of limited cabotage rights for Community airlines by 1990, but the Council
has set June 30, 1992 as the target date for introduction of a cabotage rule. See
Council Regulation 2343/90, 1990 Oj. (L 217) 8.
The Commission has also been attempting to obtain a power of attorney from
member states to negotiate, on behalf of the EC as a whole, "bilateral" air trans-
port agreements with other countries. See COM(90)576 final.
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Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia are presently negotiating an
open skies regional air transport agreement. 5 9 More ten-
tative arrangements are also under discussion about pos-
sible regional agreements concerning Mercosur
(comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay),
Central America, and the Caribbean. 60 An Australia-New
Zealand arrangement, possibly in conjunction with coun-
tries of the South Pacific, was contemplated but has been
rejected for now. 1 6 1 Furthermore, airlines from countries
belonging to the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) have been exploring the prospects for a multi-
lateral regional air transport agreement. 62
The limitations inherent in the existing labyrinth of bi-
lateral agreements constrict an air transport industry that
is now mature in many countries. As an ever increasing
number of states deregulate their domestic and interna-
tional air transport markets, the emergence of one or
more regional multilateral air transport services agree-
ments becomes a realistic possibility. The benefits accru-
ing to those like-minded liberal states who choose to
consolidate their markets through regional multilateral
agreements are many. For one, a more uniform body of
air transport regulations will govern a region and be ad-
ministered for the most part by one authority. The result
will be greater administrative and commercial efficiency
and overall stability.
More importantly for the further development of liber-
alization of international air transport, such regional mar-
kets can be structured to be more or less equal with other
markets such that there can be a fuller exchange of rights
-1, Robert C. Booth, Open Skies Over the Andes, AIRLINE Bus., Sept. 1991, at 80.
"While most of the airline world talks about liberalization, the presidents of five
countries in South America have quietly and almost unnoticed, decreed that the
Andean Pact nations of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia will
launch deregulation within the region by December 31, 1991." Id.
1 Id.
See Forsyth, supra note 57, at 73.
162 Asian Carriers Consider Forming Group To Protect Access to European Routes, Av.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 22, 1990, at 31.
645
646 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [57
on a bilateral, or even further multilateral, basis. A region
would in effect be one jurisdiction for the purpose of ne-
gotiations. Since the EC, for example, will have much
more to offer than any of its twelve member states, it may
soon be in a position to exchange liberal air transport
rights with the United States on a roughly equal bargain-
ing basis. 63 Such equality could lead to consideration of
an exchange of long-denied cabotage rights with the
United States, or even with a similarly constituted United
States-Canada regional market. 164 Ultimately, it is con-
ceivable that, as these regional "trading blocs" begin to
grow and then link up, a truly universal multilateral re-
gime will emerge. 65
VI. CONCLUSION
As the international air transport industry has grown
and matured, it has struggled to function within a regula-
tory structure that has failed to keep pace. The pressures
for change have been unrelenting since the 1960s when
airlines, in an effort to better compete, began to circum-
vent restrictions on international scheduled services
through the establishment of charter services. As a conse-
quence, "a growing gap was created between the legal
structures and the actual functioning of international air
transport."' 166 Since then, that gap has been exacerbated.
Airlines have sought various cooperative arrangements
among themselves in order to operate more efficiently
within the framework of states' protective policies, and
-s Skinner, supra note 72. "We've said time and again that we want to negotiate
an open skies agreement with a group of like-minded countries with a comparable
market size, and the European Community offers the greatest opportunity." Id.
- H.A. Wassenbergh, Towards a New Model Bilateral Air Transport Services Agree-
ment, 3 AIR L. 197, 197 (1978). "If Europe as such could negotiate a liberal "bilat-
eral" agreement with the U.S., valid for the whole combined territory of the States
participating in a European 'cabotage' region, U.S. domestic (cabotage) rights...
could be traded for intra-European traffic rights for U.S. carriers." Id. at 207.
11,- But see Louis Uchitelle, Blocs Seen Imperiling Free Trade, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 26,
1991, at DI.
1- M. Folliot, Nouvelles Orientations des Organismes Intergouvernementeaux d'Aviation
Civile, R.FR.D.ADMIN. 314 (1976).
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particularly to enable entry into markets that have tradi-
tionally been denied them. These arrangements include
revenue pooling, interlining of reservation systems, vari-
ous marketing arrangements, code sharing, mutually rec-
ognized frequent flyer programs, lease and interchange of
aircraft, and, to the extent possible, acquisition of owner-
ship in foreign airlines. It is a curious, worldwide phe-
nomenon, aptly termed "globalization," driven by both
the inability of large airlines from developed countries to
gain adequate access to strictly regulated foreign markets
and by the inability of small airlines from less developed
countries to compete with megacarriers in other increas-
ingly liberalized foreign markets. 167 The pressures driv-
ing these developments are better addressed directly by
states, however. If states can broadly relax national air-
line ownership restrictions, then the world air transport
industry will be profoundly transformed, both in terms of
the number of airlines' 6 and in their multinational make-
up.' 69  Properly managed, these changes will be wel-
comed by airlines and passengers alike. But how are they
to be achieved?
The regulation of international air transport must be
restructured to permit the objective of these changes to
be met in a more orderly and efficient way. There must
167 See, James Ott, New Trend Toward Partnerships Reshaping World Airline Industry,
Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 24, 1990, at 55; Strategic Illusions, AIRLINE Bus., Aug.
1990, at 24; James Ott, Global Alliances Transform Industry as Free Trade Grows, Av.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 26, 1990, at 42; Carole A. Shifrin, SAS Uses International
Partnerships To Assure Viability After 1992, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 26, 1990, at
48; Paul Proctor, Marketing Alliances, Joint Services Help Asian Airlines Extend Reach,
Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 26, 1990, at 74;Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, Soviets Look to
West for New Technical, CommercialAlliances, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 26, 1990,
at 76; Carolyn Hadrovic, Airline Globalization: A Canadian Perspective, 19 TRANSP. L.J.
193 (1990); Agis Salpukas, Talking Deals: 2 Airlines' Search For Global Status, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 1991, at D2.
" One author has predicted that "[b]y the year 2000, and perhaps sooner,
most of the free world's air services are likely to be provided by a score of large
multinational airlines competing on a global scale." KASPER, supra note 93, at 1.
-!, Joan M. Feldman, Will E. C. Burst the Bilateral Bubble?, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD,
June 1991, at 33, 35. "Where is the airline that is one-thirdJAL, one-third BA and
one-third United? That really is the brave, new world." Id.
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be a new "order in the air"1 70 which will provide airlines
across many mature markets the means, essential to any
similar business undertaking, to compete freely yet fairly,
to seek equity ownership without restrictions, and to op-
erate in an integrated legal regime without distinction be-
tween scheduled and non-scheduled services.17' Because
bilateral agreements will necessarily remain, an incremen-
tal approach instituting regional multilateral agreements
by like-minded liberal states presents itself as the most re-
alistic vehicle in the short term to accomplish this objec-
tive.' 72  Europe is the logical starting point. 73  In the
event of a United States-Canada "open skies" bilateral
agreement, a North Atlantic trading bloc in air transport
services would then appear feasible.
But while regional agreements may be the most promis-
ing means by which international air transport services
may be liberalized, caution must nevertheless be exer-
cised in the extent to which liberalization should be per-
mitted. The laissez-faire approach that accompanied
domestic deregulation in the United States provides les-
sons in what is to be avoided as well as in what is to be
gained: excessive concentration of airlines in some mar-
kets, varying levels of competition, inconsistent and dis-
criminatory pricing, and unsatisfactory airline profits.
With congested airports and increasingly fewer airlines
'7,, See Z. Joseph Gertler, Order in the Air and the Problem of Real and False Options, 4
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 93 (1979) (providing an overview and assessing "order in
the air" issues).
171 See generally E. Tazewell Ellett, International and U.S. Legal and Policy Impedi-
ments to the Growth of the Airline Industry: Time for a Change in the World Order?, 5 AIR &
SPACE LAW. 3 (1991) (stressing the importance of a liberalized approach to air
transport and encouraging the use of "open skies" agreements).
172 Robert J. Aaronson, Bilaterals Lead to Multilaterals, AIRLINE EXECUTIVE INT'L,
May 1991, at 50. "[I]t is too early to write the obituary for the system of bilateral
aviation agreements currently in place. More likely is that today's sophisticated
network of bilaterals will be complemented by one or more regional multilaterals
before the end of this century." Id.
17. Hammarskj6ld, supra note 153, at 81. "As international air transport devel-
ops, new regulatory structures are needed. Europe with its sizeable air transport
market and advanced structure of international cooperation, will play a key role in
developing those new structures." Id.
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operating virtually impenetrable near-monopolies at their
hubs, many see regulation of market entry as essential to
permitting equal opportunity for aspiring new airlines. 1 74
This holds equally true for foreign airlines, whose govern-
ments will balk at exchanging cabotage rights without as-
surance of fair access to domestic markets. 75  In this
respect, ironically, a certain measure of regulation is ar-
guably necessary for the further liberalization of interna-
tional air transport.
Regulation of airline safety merits special attention.
While diminished safety itself has been raised as a prob-
lem arising from excessive liberalization, 76 the concern
from a conceptual and legal perspective has more to do
with the question of responsibility for safety regulation,
with respect to both airlines and their aircraft. While it is
true that states have ultimate regulatory authority over all
airlines and aircraft while within their airspace, the states
whose nationals hold ownership and control in those air-
lines and aircraft have traditionally been responsible for
the ongoing safety certification of airlines and aircraft. 77
,14 The concern is being recognized in the United States. House Bill 2268, in-
troduced May 8, 1991 would grant airlines more access to landing slots, regulate
computer reservations systems, and reassign and supervise some international
routes. H.R. 2268, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
7.5 For example, one of the fundamental issues underlying negotiations toward
"open skies" in the proposed new United States-Canada bilateral agreement is
access for Canadian airlines to United States airports where slot systems are the
practice, i.e., New York Kennedy and LaGuardia, Chicago O'Hare, Washington
National. See Geoffrey Rowan, "Effective Access" Key to Open Skies Treaty, TORorro
GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 10, 1991, at BI.
17, See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
77 Article 12 of the Chicago Convention imposes a general obligation on states
for safety regulation of all aircraft operations taking place within their airspace.
With respect to airline operations the Chicago Convention does not impose
specific obligations on states specifically with respect to airline operations. But
states have traditionally exercised regulatory responsibility based on substantial
ownership and effective control in the hands of their nationals. See also supra text
accompanying notes 114-16.
With respect to safety regulation of aircraft, article 12 of the Chicago Conven-
tion also specifically imposes regulatory obligations on the state of registry of an
aircraft, which, pursuant to Article 18, must be a single state. Article 19 further
stipulates that state's registration of aircraft is to be "in accordance with its laws
and regulations." Most states again have used broadly-defined ownership as the
basis for registration, and therefore regulation, of aircraft.
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A fundamental problem arises from the fact that a state's
responsibility to regulate airlines, for both commercial
and safety purposes, is based on ownership. Assuming
that agreement can be reached to deregulate the interna-
tional air transport industry, states will proceed to relin-
quish regulatory control over commercial operations by
relaxing national airline ownership requirements or ex-
panding market entry through cabotage. As a result,
though, regulation of safety would be in disarray. "Na-
tional" airlines and aircraft would often be based or oper-
ated outside the country for possibly indefinite periods of
time, a real concern both in terms of maintenance of
safety and of expenditure of resources.1 78 At the same
time, "foreign" airlines and aircraft would be based or op-
erated within the country at a level that would require
greater surveillance. 179 The dilemma is thus: How can air-
line ownership and market entry restrictions be relaxed to
accommodate airline commercial interests without at the
same time undermining the existing basis for safety
control? 80
The answer is that they cannot be so relaxed. Liberali-
178 An analogous problem has already arisen as a result of the growth of lease,
charter, and interchange of aircraft between airlines in international operations.
Due to the frequent difficulty or impossibility of transferring registration as a re-
sult of the lease of aircraft, states of registry are faced with enormous regulatory
problems respecting aircraft that will be absent from the country for long periods
of time (or of not approving the lease at all). ICAO has proposed as a solution an
amendment to the Chicago Convention (Article 83, as yet not in force) whereby
the state of registry of an aircraft would be permitted to agree with the state of the
proposed lessee of that aircraft to transfer to the state of the lessee certain of its
regulatory responsibilities. See Irene Elizabeth Howie & Roderick D. van Dam,
Facilitating the Lease and Interchange of Civil Aircraft, 44 ICAO BULL. 2, 9 (1989).
A similar solution to the problem of airlines and their aircraft being absent from
the country for long periods of time, due to national ownership of a foreign-based
airline or cabotage, would likely not be workable outside a bilateral relationship.
171 "It's not just cabotage but FAA certification of what airlines can do at certain
airports, i.e., licensing, registration, facilitation, customs and immigration. The
prospect of accomplishing all that is 'frightening.' " Joan M. Feldman, The Foreign-
Ownership Dilemma, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Jan. 1991, at 24.
" Under a very liberal North Atlantic air transport services arrangement, one
may wonder, for example, which state is to be responsible for the safety regulation
of an airline owned by Dutch nationals, headquartered in the United States, and
carrying out substantial domestic operations out of a hub in Canada.
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zation of international air transport that includes relaxed
national ownership requirements or cabotage effectively
invalidates the notion of "national" and "foreign" airlines
and with it the ownership basis for safety regulation. A
new and inventive airline regulatory regime based on cri-
teria other than ownership will have to be devised that ac-
commodates the existence of multinational airlines and
the global operations of national airlines.' 8 ' One possibil-
ity is to base a state's responsibility to regulate airline
safety on an airline's broadly defined "base of opera-
tions." Another is to return to the concept of an interna-
tional regulatory authority first proposed at the Chicago
Convention in 1944.182 Such proposals will require ex-
tensive discussion and elaboration, however. In the
meantime, it is more likely that states will relax airline
ownership requirements and market entry restrictions
only moderately.
The strict regulation that has characterized interna-
tional air transport throughout its history is a direct con-
sequence of the sovereignty that states exercise as owners
of rights in airspace. Many see this as an unfortunate de-
velopment. One author has argued, for example, that
"[a]ir traffic is no more a national entitlement than air is a
negotiable national resource. A sounder legal philosophy
would have prevented the abusive trade-off among na-
tions of commodities which should be treated as interna-
tional by nature."183
On the other hand, it must be recognized that states do
i"' One innovative solution to a problem of regulatory responsibility involved
the multinational operations of SAS and Air Afrique, where in each case joint
regulatory control was exercised. With respect to the obligations under the Chi-
cago Convention to regulate the airlines' aircraft, particularly the requirement to
register aircraft in one state pursuant to Article 18, special arrangements, includ-
ing a joint register and communal aircraft markings, were devised with ICAO's
approval. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 7, at 19-20.
As the states themselves jointly owned the airlines and the aircraft, however, it
was clear in these cases, under the existing ownership basis of regulation, which
states would maintain a regulatory role in respect of both.
'K2 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
1'9 NAVEAU, supra note 23, at 231.
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have a legitimate interest in overseeing aviation activity
within their borders. National governments will continue
to want to exercise a minimum level of control over air-
lines operating within their countries for reasons of
safety, national security, and domestic policy. These
states' concerns about operations within their airspace
make air transport more than just another business and
dictate a certain measure of ongoing state involvement.
In any event, the psychology of sovereignty seems firmly
entrenched among states. As a practical matter, they will
not surrender it easily. As a result, absolute, universal
free trade in international air transport services will likely
never be realized. According to one author:
[T]he laws of free enterprise can never be applied simplis-
tically to the airline (industry) which must always require
both competition and regulation. As long as nations feel
dependent on airlines as the lifelines of their trade, they
will not deregulate the international system; and no airline
... can escape from its dependence on the government in
the critical bargains for landing and traffic rights."s4
The liberalization of international air transport
presents problems that are challenging but not insur-
mountable. States are at least coming to accept the fact
that narrow unilateral and bilateral approaches are less
suited to effecting fundamental changes to a system that is
founded in multilateralism.18 5 The desired extent of these
changes is less clear, and uncertainty has resulted in an
evolving search for the optimum balance between regula-
tion and liberalization on a global basis. It is not an easy
issue, but its successful resolution will have an impact that
goes far beyond an industry as integral to world com-
merce as air transport.
,14 SAMPSON, supra note 25, at 228.
'i. ICAO has summoned a worldwide "Air Transport Colloquium" to be held
in Montreal, April 6-10, 1992 to address concerns relating to liberalization and
globalization of air transport. The resulting report will be submitted for consider-
ation by the ICAO Assembly in 1992, which may then convene a formal Air Traffic
Conference for 1993 or 1994. See ICAO News Release P1O 9/91.
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